













   




















MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT POLICY AND 







PROFESSORA DOUTORA ANA ISABEL ORTEGA VENÂNCIO




This study analyzes the impact of the minimum capital requirement policy on 
entrepreneurial activity. More precisely, it investigates how a reduction of the minimum 
capital requirement affects firms’ creation and their initial capital structure. Our data 
comes from a Portuguese database – Simplified Corporate Information (SCIE), Sistema 
de Contas Integradas das Empresas. We apply the difference-in-difference approach 
using a treated group with Sociedades por Quotas and control group of Sociedades 
Anonimas.   
We find that reducing the minimum capital required to start a business leads to an 
increase in firm’s entry and job creation by about 15%. The reform mainly stimulates 
formation of very small firms with one and two employees. Also, the amounts of initial 
capital and first year debt and equity of start-ups decrease with the reform. However, the 
initial capital structure of new firms does not change. There is no statistically significant 
impact of the reform on the new firms’ debt-to-equity ratio.      
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O presente estudo analisa o impacto da política de requisitos mínimos de capital na 
atividade empreendedora. Mais precisamente, investiga como uma redução dos 
requisitos mínimos de capital afeta a criação das empresas e a sua estrutura de capital 
inicial. Para a elaboração desta dissertação, utilizamos um conjunto de dados 
provenientes da base de dados portuguesa – SCIE, Sistema de Contas Integradas das 
Empresas. De forma a identificar o impacto da reforma, aplicamos o método de 
diferenças em diferenças usando um grupo tratado com Sociedades por Quotas e um 
grupo de controlo com Sociedades Anónimas. 
As nossas principais conclusões são que a redução dos requisitos mínimos de capital 
para iniciar uma start-up leva a um aumento na entrada das empresas e emprego em 
cerca de 15%. A reforma estimula principalmente a formação de empresas muito 
pequenas com um e dois funcionários. Adicionalmente, o valor do capital inicial, dívida 
e capital próprio para o primeiro ano de funcionamento das empresas diminui com a 
reforma. Contudo, a estrutura de capital inicial das novas empresas não é afetada. Não 
há impacto estatisticamente significativo da reforma no rácio da dívida/capital próprio 
das novas empresas. 
 
Palavras-chave: Capital Social Inicial, Start-ups, Estrutura Financeira, Capital 
Próprio, Capital Alheio, Entrada de Novas Empresas  
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In recent years governments around the world have focused on encouraging 
entrepreneurship as a way to promote job creation, innovation and economic growth 
(Blanchflower, 2000; Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Carree and Thurik, 2003; Kreft and 
Sobel, 2005; Djankov, McLiesh and Ramahlo, 2006). The main policy implemented has 
been optimizing procedures and reducing time and costs to set up a business (World 
Bank, 2016).  
Another popular measure has been lowering or eliminating the minimum capital 
requirement (World Bank 2014, 2016). Such a policy creates a more attractive 
environment for firms’ entry (Van Stel et al., 2007; Becht et al., 2008). For example, 
eliminating the minimum capital requirement and lowering incorporation costs favored 
the increase of foreign limited companies in the UK (Becht et al., 2008).
1
 According to 
the same authors, this policy was among the driven factors in corporate mobility 
especially among firms originating from high minimum capital requirements countries.  
Previous literature suggests that lack of capital is a major constraint to entrepreneurial 
activity (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al.,1994; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1998; Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2006). Failure to find the necessary funds 
prevents individuals from entering into entrepreneurship (Holtz-Eakin et al.,1994, 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998, Armour, 2006). For example, Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989) find that individuals with greater assets are more likely to start a business than 
those with scanty financial resources. Receiving an inheritance is also associated with 
higher probability of entering into entrepreneurship (Holtz-Eakin et al.,1994). Thus the 
                                                             
1
 It is important to note that after 2000 the European Court of Justice permitted to freely choose firm’s 
location within the European Union 




liquidity constraints theory suggests that the minimum capital requirement policy is a 
binding limitation to start a business. Imposing a fixed amount of assets in the 
beginning of the life of start-up reduces firm entry (Van Stel, Storey and Thurik, 2007). 
Also, previous studies suggest that the mandatory initial capital fails to fulfill its main 
function: protect creditors and consumers interests (Djankov et al., 2002; Armour, 
2006; Djankov, 2009). The fixed amount of minimum capital does not serve as 
collateral to creditors as it is not related to potential risks of a particular firm activity 
(Armour, 2006; Djankov, 2009). Others argue that entry barriers promote corruption 
and informal economy rather than bringing benefits for the consumers (Djankov et al., 
2002).  
In 2011, Portugal reduced the initial capital requirement for new firms from 100 euro to 
1 euro per quota and diminished the total amount of capital from 5,000 euro to any 
value (Law N
o
 33/2011).  This new regulation applies to private limited liability 
companies. The goal of this policy was to promote entrepreneurial initiative and 
stimulate innovation and business development.  
In this study we evaluate the effects of this policy by providing new insights on existing 
country-specific literature devoted to firm entry costs. Our research questions are: What 
is the impact of this policy on firm entry? Does it affect firms’ initial capital structure?  
To answer these questions, we use the Simplified Corporate Information database 
(SCIE), Sistema de Contas Intergradas das Empresas. This database has comprehensive 
information on the number of new private firms established between 2004 and 2014. 
For each firm we collect detailed information on their initial capital structure and firm 




characteristics (size, industry, legal form and year of entry). The time range allows us to 
cover the periods before and after policy change. 
We find that cutting minimum capital requirement promotes entrepreneurship in a way 
that it increases firms’ entry. The reform increases the number of new firms as well as 
jobs created by almost 15%. It favors mostly very small firms with one or two 
employees. In terms of new firms’ initial capital structure, the reform does not affect the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the analyzed start-ups. But post-reform firms are characterized by 
lower initial capital amount as well as lower equity and debt amounts registered in the 
entry year compared to the firms created in the absence of the reform. 
This study contributes to the understanding of the effects of minimum capital policy on 
entrepreneurial activity and new firms’ capital structure. Better understanding of the 
efficacy of this kind of policy can help policy makers to define appropriate measures 
towards promotion of entrepreneurship.  
Our study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and section 3 presents 
the hypotheses. Then, in section 4 we describe the policy. Section 5 presents the data. In 
section 6 the empirical methodology and results are reported. Finally, section 7 
concludes.  
  




2. Literature Review 
2.1 Entry regulation  
The entry regulation includes the time, costs, procedures and minimum capital required 
to register a business (World Bank , 2016).  The rationale for entry regulation is 
established by the public interest theory. According to this theory, the stringent entry 
rules are needed to correct market failures and to assure higher quality of products and 
other socially relevant outcomes (Djankov et al., 2002). Nevertheless, Djankov et al. 
(2002) do not find support for this theory. In fact, they do not find positive correlation 
between the entry regulatory framework and product quality, health or environment.  In 
contrast, the public choice theory argues that entry regulation serves in favor of insiders’ 
interests (De Soto, 1989; Stigler, 1971).  More severe regulatory tools are linked to 
higher corruption and bureaucracy (Djankov et al., 2002). Moreover, large entry costs 
compel firms to operate within informal sector, thereby enable unofficial economy 
(Djankov et al., 2002).  Other beneficiaries of stringent entry regulation are industry 
incumbent firms (Stigler, 1971). Entry barriers allow the incumbent firms to gain 
competitive advantage position and thus benefit from increase in profits and in market 
power (Djankov, 2009). 
In the last years, several studies have empirically analyzed the scope of entry regulatory 
framework and business start-up activity. High number of procedures and time required 
to set up a company is associated with lower entry rates (Fonseca et al., 2001). 
Burdensome entry barriers result in a reduction of entry and growth even in industries 
with naturally high entry rates (Klapper et al., 2006). High level of regulation deters 
entrepreneurship by preventing individuals from starting a business (Ardagna and 
Lusardi, 2010). In particular, burdensome entry regulation negatively affects 




opportunity entrepreneurship (Levie and Autio, 2011). On contrast, better business 
regulation is associated with higher level of firms’ creation (Divanbeigi and Romalbo, 
2015).  
Other studies evaluate the effects of entry deregulation reforms (Monteiro and 
Assuncao, 2006; Mullainathan and Schnabl, 2010; Bruhn, 2011; Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya, 2013; Branstetter et al., 2014). Recent examples of such reforms include 
the creation of rapid business opening system in Mexico (Bruhn, 2011) and the opening 
of one-stop shop in Portugal (Branstetter et al., 2014). In both cases the authors show 
that such entry process simplifications promoted firm and job creation.  
2.2 Minimum capital policy 
Besides time, costs and number of procedures, other reforms involve changing the 
minimum capital required to start a new firm (World Bank, 2014). A recent empirical 
study of the UK suggests that eliminating the minimum capital serves as a driving factor 
for firms’ incorporations (Becht et al., 2008). In recent years, the UK experienced a 
business registration inflow, particularly from the countries with higher minimum 
capital requirements (Becht et al., 2008).  Following this, several countries have applied 
the same policy (Bratton et al, 2008; Eckardt, 2012; Ringe, 2013). For instance, since 
2008 German start-ups can be established through a new legal form 
(Unternehmergesellschaft) with 1 euro of capital. This measure decreased the number of 
German companies incorporated outside Germany, particularly in the UK (Eckardt and 
Kerber, 2013). Also Hungary and Poland significantly lowered their minimum capital 
requirements (Hornuf, 2012; Braun et al., 2011) and France reduced minimum capital 
requirement to 1 euro (Ringe, 2013). All these reforms resulted in an increase of start-
ups in all four countries (Hornuf, 2012, Braun et al., 2011). Another example is Saudi 




Arabia which before 2007 had one of the highest minimum capital requirements in the 
world, 125 000 dollars (Belayachi and Haidar, 2008). Its elimination led to an increase 
in business registration by 81% (Nehau, 2013). Thus, empirical evidence suggests that 
reducing minimum capital requirement increases firm formation.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the empirical evidence on entry reforms. 
  




3. Theory and Hypothesis. 
Minimum capital requirement implies that the founder has to make a deposit in bank or 
allocate a fixed amount of assets to the new firm (World Bank, 2014). The capital 
required to set up a firm depends on the legal structure of the start-up (Schoen, 2004; 
Eidenmueller et al., 2006) and it represents the price of entry to limited liability 
(Armour, 2006; Eidenmueller et al., 2006; Machado, 2009).  
Several reasons have been appointed to require a minimum capital. By investing the 
initial capital, shareholders obtain the ownership rights to claim firm’s returns and 
creditors obtain collaterals for their claims (Armour, 1999). Also, the minimum capital 
requirement protects creditors in case of bankruptcy (Djankov, 2009; World Bank, 
2014) and it creates a buffer in case of future losses and thus, to a certain extent, 
safeguards against insolvency (Eidenmueller et al., 2006). 
Moreover, it prevents individuals from hazardous activities (Pentz et al., 2006). The 
capital invested implies a commitment from the shareholders and thus prevents them 
from pursuing bad projects (Engert, 2006). Mandatory initial capital prevents 
unpromising business ventures at the expenses of the creditors (Eidenmueller et al., 
2006). It excludes formation of undercapitalized companies and externalization of risks 
(Ewang, 2007; Machado, 2009). Minimum capital requirement also aims to protect 
consumers and to screen undesired firms (Djankov, 2009; World Bank, 2014). It sorts 
out individuals who engage in entrepreneurship only to get away from unemployment 
(Hornuf, 2012).   




Previous literature suggests that minimum capital requirement creates a barrier for 
starting a business (Enriques and Gelter, 2006; Armour, 2006; Ewang, 2007; Payne, 
2008; Djankov, 2009; Machado 2009; Petroseviciene, 2010).  
The minimum capital requirement is one of the costs that entrepreneurs incur when 
registering a business (Djankov et al. 2002; Bratton et al, 2008). It is regarded as 
indirect cost imposed to potential entrepreneurs (Braun et al., 2011).  
The minimum capital requirement increases the costs of financial constraints (Becht et 
al., 2008). According to liquidity constraints theory, new firm creation depends on the 
assets the individuals have at their disposal (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et 
al., 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Armour, 2006; Fairlie and Krashinsky, 
2006). Wealthier individuals are more likely to bear risks and thus to enter into 
entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). The choice towards entrepreneurship is 
facilitated by exogenous increases in personal assets, like receiving inheritance 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994). But not enough money to 
meet minimum capital requirement prevents individuals to become entrepreneurs, 
especially risk-averse individuals (Armour, 2006). In order to meet the initial capital 
stock, shareholders take personal loans (Machado, 2009). Thereby, lowering the 
minimum capital requirement reduces the costs to start a new business, consequently we 
expect an increase of firm entry. In contrast, high levels of minimum capital are linked 
to lower rate of self-employment (Armour and Cumming, 2005) and decreases firm 
entry (Dreher and Gassebner, 2013). Thus, reducing minimum capital requirement will 
lead to higher entry rates (Van Stel et al., 2007).  
Thus, we expect: 




Hypothesis 1: The minimum capital requirement reform increases firms’ entry. 
According to the signal theory, the amount invested signals the shareholders’ intentions 
to start a business as well as their confidence on the venture quality (Pentz et al., 2006; 
Machado, 2009). It gives a sign to creditors about firm’s trustworthiness (Engert, 2006, 
Enriques and Gelter, 2006) and it shows to the creditors that certain assets are available 
for their claims (Ewang, 2007). Thus, it makes easier to raise external funds and it helps 
to obtain financing from creditors who consider the amount of paid in capital before 
making the lending decision (Ewang, 2007). As such, the mandatory capital reduces 
information asymmetry between shareholders and debt holders (Armour, 1999), 
facilitates borrowing (Ewang, 2007) and provides financing for company’s operation 
(Pentz et al., 2006).  
Nevertheless, previous literature suggests that minimum capital requirement does not 
necessarily meet the financial needs of the company (Schoen, 2004; Pentz et al., 2006). 
The amount fixed by law does not take into account the industry or firm activity 
(Djankov, 2009; World Bank 2014). For some types of firms there is no need for a large 
amount of initial capital. For example, intellectual services firms do not need a large 
amount of capital to start their operations (Machado, 2009). As it disregards business 
characteristics, the minimum capital requirement does not safeguard from all the risks 
associated with firms’ activity (Macey and Enriques, 2001; Schoen, 2004; Armour, 
2006). Thus, it does not reflect entirely the creditworthiness of the company (Engert, 
2006). After the initial phase, the entry capital can be used to purchase assets which 
value can decrease over time (Macey and Enriques, 2001). Thereby, it does not provide 
creditors with the real information about assets value and firm’s solvency (Macey and 
Enriques, 2001; Schoen, 2004; Ewang, 2007). Minimum capital requirement is not an 




important variable considered by creditors in lending decisions (Armour, 1999; Ewang, 
2007). Creditors judge the firm’s ability to repay the debt based on its net worth, cash 
flows and risk profile rather than on its ability to meet minimum capital requirement 
(Armour, 1999; Ewang, 2007; Djankov, 2009). To safeguard their interests creditors use 
other measures, namely, establish a high interest rate, ask for collateral from 
shareholders, or ask to comply with certain financial ratios (Macey and Enriques, 2001; 
Schoen 2004). Banks do not consider as a loan’s collateral the amount of minimum 
capital contributions, but instead demand the assets purchased by the loan as collateral 
(Eidenmueller et al. 2006). Similarly, contractual provisions can be applied by the trade 
creditors and debt holders (Macey and Enriques, 2001). Moreover, the debt repayment 
depends on the firm’s cash flows and not on the initial capital of the start-up (Dorsey, 
2013). In summary, minimum capital requirement lacks a positive effect in terms of 
access to credit (Dorsey, 2013). 
According with the signal theory, the invested amount signals the quality of a firm and 
the ability of shareholders to bear the risks when benefiting from limited liability 
(Ewang, 2007). Eliminating the minimum capital requirement leads founders to invest 
more than the minimum threshold defined by the law. For example, in France one year 
after the reform which reduced the minimum capital requirement from 7 500 euro to 1 
euro, the average initial capital voluntary invested in newly created firms was 2 000 
euro. Also, the percentage of companies with 1 euro of share capital was 7,63% of the 
total number of firms (Greffe de Paris, 2004). Although, the majority of entrepreneurs 
set up a share capital lower than the amount previously prescribed by law, this amount 
was higher than the mandatory 1 euro. 




Regarding firm’s capital structure, the minimum capital requirement reform does not 
affect the choice between debt and equity financing (Hazak, 2009). Therefore, we 
expect: 
Hypothesis 2: The minimum capital reform does not affect the initial capital structure of 
the start-ups.  
  





Portugal implemented the minimum capital requirement reform in 2011 (Law N
o 
33/2011) as a part of the business registration simplification process launched in 2005. 
The reform started by reducing the time and costs of starting a business and by 
establishing one-stop shop in several counties. This broad set of measures was thereafter 
extended to eliminating the minimum capital requirement. The summary of the law is 
provided in Table 2. 
This policy aims to promote entrepreneurial activity by reducing the entry costs and 
administrative burden for new business. As noted before, the minimum capital 
requirement does not constitute a true guarantee for the creditors; a great number of 
start-ups does not need initial capital to operate; the minimum capital requirement 
creates a barrier to entry, especially for young entrepreneurs without personal financial 
resources. According to the World Bank (2012), this reform is seen as a positive 
measure and is considered a good practice to facilitate business start-ups.  
Before the reform, the minimum capital required to set-up a private limited liability 
company in Portugal was 5 000 euro with the minimum amount of 100 euro per quota
2
. 
With the reform the minimum amount per quota reduced to 1 euro
3
 and the total capital 
can be defined freely. Therefore, sole proprietors can start a business with just 1 euro. 
Two founders can establish a private limited liability company with 2 euros. 
Additionally,  founders can defer its payment till the end of the first financial year and 
can withdraw it from the bank account after the company’s legal registration.  
                                                             
2 Articles 201, 219 of Commercial Companies’ Code (Código das Sociedades Comerciais), DL n.º 
343/98, de 06 de Novembro 
3 The law of  7th of March 2011 Decreto-Lei nº 33/2011 




The firms eligible for this reform are sole owner private limited liability companies 
(Sociedades Unipessoas  por Quotas) and private limited liability companies 
(Sociedades por Quotas) with two or more individuals.  All the other types of single 
person companies such as individual establishments of limited liability 
(Estabelecimento Individual de Responsabilidade Limitada) and sole proprietors with 
unlimited liability (Empresário em Nome Individual) are not covered by this law. Also, 
public limited companies (Sociedade Anônima), general partnerships (Sociedade em 
Nome Coletivo), limited partnerships (Sociedade em Comandita) or cooperative 
enterprises (Cooperativa) are also not eligible.  
Firms that require a special authorization or that are under special laws are not eligible.  
For example, financial institutions have to comply with special regulation which 
requires them to have a minimum capital.
4
 Travel agencies, passenger transport 
companies, taxi services, private security companies are among the business activities 
that need license for their operation. Table 3 presents the list of activities that are not 
eligible to the reform and require minimum capital.  
 
  
                                                             
4 see Portaria 335/2013 of 15th of November which modifies Portaria 95/94 of 9th of February 




5.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our data comes from Simplified Corporate Information database (SCIE), Sistema de 
Contas Integradas das Empresas. This data unites the Simplified Business Information 
(IES) data, Statistics Portugal, Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas(INE), data and the 
Ministry of Finance information on private companies and self-employed individuals. It 
provides annual information on the main characteristics of the enterprises in Portugal. It 
is based on the accounting data, economic and financial indicators and ratios. It allows 
tracing the progress of the business economic activity on the firm’s level over the years. 
The data is available from 2004 to 2014. 
We restrict our analysis to the period between 2004 and 2014. We start by selecting all 
new firms established in each year and collect data on the main industry (CAE rev 3), 
region (NUTS 2), legal form, size (number of employees), entry year, exit year, sales, 
initial capital, equity and debt. We drop the year 2011 as we do not have information on 
the month that the firms were created. Besides that, we exclude firms established in non 
eligible industries. Furthermore, we eliminate firms which initial capital is below the 
minimum thresholds defined by the law. As there is no full set of information available 
for sole proprietors, we do not include this kind of firms into the dataset. Also we 
eliminate firms with the legal form Sociedade em Nome Colectivo as its observations 
are limited to 20 new firms. Thus, we analyze firms with legal form Sociedade por 
Quotas which is our treated group (firms affected by the reform) and firms with legal 
form Sociedade Anónima as a counterfactual.  
The main characteristics of these two types of firms are given in the Table 4. In terms of 
number of founders, Sociedade por Quotas can be formed by at least two individuals (or 
1 if it is Unipessoal) while Sociedades Anónimas should have minimum five 




shareholders. The initial minimum capital required by law for Sociedade Anónima 
equals 50 000 euro
5
 and this amount remained unchanged for the period covered in our 
analysis. As we previously mentioned, the reform changed the initial minimum capital 
of Sociedade por Quotas from 5 000 to 1 euro. Both types of firms are limited liability.  
Our sample consists of the 231 016 new firms created in the period of ten years which is 
divided to pre-reform period from 2004 to 2010 and post-reform period from 2012 to 
2014. These firms represent sixty seven different industries, seven regions and two legal 
forms. The most representative industries in our sample are retail trade, wholesale, 
restaurants and catering, real estate activities, development and building construction.  
Figure 1 presents the number of firms created per legal form in the period from 2004 to 
2014. Both legal forms followed the same trend of firms’ registrations till year 2010.  
Also, we found high positive correlation of 0,83 (statistically significant at 5%) between 
the yearly firms registrations of both legal forms before the reform.   
Table 5 presents the average number of the firm registrations per year and legal form 
before and after the reform. On average, before the reform 23 053 new firms were 
created per year and after the reform this number increased to 23 214 totally for both 
legal forms. About two thirds of the firms are established in the North and Lisbon 
regions. The average number of new Sociedades por Quotas created per year increased 
by almost two per cent while the average number of Sociedades Anónimas decreased 
from 852 to 597 new firms. Both legal forms are widespread more in North and Lisbon 
regions before and after the reform.  
                                                             
5
 Article 276 of Commercial Companies’ Code (Código das Sociedades Comerciais), DL n.º 343/98, de 06 
de Novembro 




Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics. Firms in our sample are small, with two 
employees on average in Sociedades por Quotas and three in Sociedades Anónimas. 
After the reform, the initial size of Sociedades por Quotas decreased slightly. The 
average paid-in capital of Sociedades por Quotas decreased significantly in the post-
reform period, by 41%, compared to the pre-reform time. In case of Sociedades 
Anónimas, the initial capital mean changed from 339,77 thousand euro before year 2011 
to 245,93 thousand euro after, which is counted as 28% decrease. Also, firms created 
after the reform have less equity and more debt financing. Both legal forms reduce their 
equity, but debt increases only for Sociedades Anónimas. In terms of firms’ survival 
from the firms created in the pre-reform period 95,6% operated for more than one year, 
for the post-reform newly created firms the one-year survival rate is 93,9%. Survival 
rates decrease with time for both legal forms. 
Table 7 presents the number of Sociedades por Quotas according to the amount of 
initial capital.  In the pre-reform time the major part of these firms (about 76%) has 
initial capital equal to the minimum threshold of five thousands euro previously fixed 
by law. After the reform the number of new Sociedades por Quotas with initial capital 
less or equal to the previous threshold increased to 85%, about 3% of which have initial 
capital equal to the new minimum required amount of 1 euro per quota.   
  




6. Methodological Approach, Variables and Results 
Our empirical strategy compares how firm entry and capital structure changed after and 
before the minimum capital requirement reform. To evaluate the effect of the reform on 
entrepreneurial activity we apply a difference-in difference methodology. This approach 
implies data for two time periods, before and after the reform, and two groups of 
analysis, treated and control group. The treated group  includes eligible firms, 
Sociedades por Quotas. The control group is formed by non-eligible firms, Sociedades 
Anónimas. We assume that as the control group was not affected by the reform, any 
possible changes in its data refer to the common trend for both groups. Thus we could 
use the difference in the control group as an approximation for this trend. Our key 
identifying assumption is that the firm entry trends would be identical for both legal 
forms in the absence of the reform.  
6.1 Firm Entry 
 
To test our first hypothesis, we estimate the following model: 
                                      (1) 
where i denotes legal form, y is entry year, n is region and j is industry.  
The dependent variable is logarithm of the number of new entries Yiy. The variable αy 
controls for the macroeconomic shocks, λn refers to the region fixed effect and θj is 
industry fixed effect. Treatedi is a dummy variable equalling one if firm’s legal form is 
affected by the reform, Sociedades por Quotas, and zero for Sociedades Anónimas.  
 Our variable of interest is Policyiy. It equals one if Sociedades por Quotas was 
established in the post-reform period and zero otherwise. The coefficient β is the 




difference-in-difference estimator of interest. It identifies the change in firm entry 
within Sociedades por Quotas legal form that is not represented by the corresponding 
change in firm entry within non-treated legal form. We expect β to be positive, as in our 
theory reducing the minimum capital requirement leads to an increase in firm entry.  
Column 1 and 2 of Table 8 present our estimates for firm entry excluding the year 2011. 
The result shows that reducing of the minimum capital requirement is related to an 
increase of firms’ entry of about 15%.  The coefficient is statistically significant (with 
p-value=0,000 and t-value=3,84). Also, we estimate the model including as additional 
controls logarithm of population and logarithm of gross domestic product per each 
region and year. The Policyiy coefficient does not change.  
For the robustness check we include the year 2011 and present the results in columns 3 
and 4 of the Table 8. The Policyiy coefficient does not vary too much despite the sample 
change. It equals to 0,147, thus, it stays very close to the previous estimation, remains 
positive and statistically significant.   
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results of estimating the impact of the minimum capital 
requirement reform on jobs creation. We run the regression which is specified by the 
equation (1), but in this case the dependent variable is logarithm of the initial number of 
employees. The reform has a positive effect on initial employment. The number of jobs 
created increases by 14,6% and 14,9% excluding and including the year 2011, 
respectively. To sum up, the reform is associated with increase in firm entry and creates 
more jobs. 
Next, we analyze which kinds of firms are induced to the market as a result of the 
reform. Table 9 presents the results for equation (1) with additional controls where the 




dependent variable is the number of firms per size. We consider four categories of firms 
according to the number of initial employees: one, two, from three to five and more than 
five employees. The reform leads to an increase in the number of smaller firms with one 
and two employees. For the firms of other sizes the impact of the reform is negative but 
not statistically significant for firms with more than five employees.  
Also, we examine the impact of the reform on the one-year survival rate of the start-ups. 
We estimate the regression (1) with additional controls where the dependent variable is 
equal to one if a firm continued its operation after one year from its entry and zero if 
not. The results are presented in the Table 10. The coefficient on policy equals to -0,01 
and is statistically significant at 10% (p-value=0,073). And in the estimation including 
the year 2011 the policy impact stays negative but is not statistically significant. Thus, 
the firms established after the reform are slightly less likely to survive than the firms 
created in its absence.  
6.2 Capital Structure 
To evaluate the impact of the reform on the firms’ initial capital structure we use the 
following model: 
                                       (2) 
where f indicates firm level,  i refers to legal form, y matches the year and n indicates 
the region.  
The dependent variable is debt-to-equity ratio in the first year of the start-up. The 
dummy variable Treatedi equals one if the firm belongs to Sociedade por Quotas and 
represents a treatment group and zero if a firm is Sociedade Anónima and represents a 
control group. The variable Policyiy takes the value of one if the firm was created at any 




of the post-reform years and has a legal form Sociedade por Quotas. In case a firm was 
created as Sociedade Anónima or/and it was created before the reform, the variable 
Policyiy equals zero. Our coefficient of interest is β which stands for the policy effect. 
We expect the coefficient to be not statistically significant suggesting that the minimum 
capital requirement reform did not affect firms’ initial capital structure. 
The variable αy denotes year fixed effects, λn denotes region fixed effects and θj controls 
for industries fixed effects. 
Table 11 reports the regression output. The coefficient of the variable Policyiy is 
negative (-0,236) but not statistically significant, its p-value is very high (0,961) and t-
value is low (-0,05).  
When we control for additional firm characteristics such as logarithm of firm’s sales 
and logarithm of initial employees, the coefficient on policy equals to -0,25 and remains 
not statistically significant with p-value of 0,958 and t-value of -0,05. Thus, the reform 
does not affect initial capital structure of new firms.  
As a robustness check we again estimate equation (2) without and with the vector of 
firm control variables (logarithm of firm’s sales and employees) and include data for the 
year 2011. Thus, Policyiy is equal to one if Sociedade por Quotas was created in the 
period 2011-2014 and zero otherwise. The coefficients are reported in Column (3) and 
(4) of Table 11. The Policyiy coefficient increases to 0,2 but remains not statistically 
significant with very high p-value of 0,96. Thus, the minimum capital reform does not 
affect initial capital structure of new firms when we included the year 2011.  
Next, we analyze the impact of the reform to the amount of initial capital, the amount of 
equity and the amount of debt in the year of firm’s entry. We estimate the tobit 




regression described by equation (2) for the logarithm of initial capital and the 
logarithm of debt as dependent variables. For the dependent variable logarithm of equity 
we apply OLS regression with the same equation (2). The results are presented in the 
Table 11 for the estimations without and with control variables, excluding and including 
the year 2011.  
With the reform, the amount of the paid-in capital of new firms decreases by 1,15. The 
coefficient remains negative and statistically significant (p-value=0,000) when we 
include the controls and the year 2011. Thus, the reform induces firms to have less 
amount of initial capital than the amount paid-in by newly formed firms in the absence 
of the reform. 
Regarding the impact of the reform on the debt amount, it decreases by 2,6. The change 
in equity caused by the reform is also estimated to be negative. The coefficient on 
policy equals minus 0,45 and is statistically significant. The similar affects remain with 
addition of controls and of the year 2011 to the corresponding estimations. So the 
reform leads to less equity and even less debt amount in the first year of firms’ 
operation.             





In this work we analyze the effect of the minimum capital requirement reform on 
entrepreneurial activity. The reform significantly lowered the minimum capital required 
to create firms with legal form Sociedade por Quotas in Portugal. Using a firm level 
data from the Simplified Corporate Information database (SCIE) we perform the 
difference-in-difference analysis to find how the reform influenced firms’ creation and 
initial capital structure.   
As it was expected, reducing of the minimum capital requirement stimulates start-up 
activity. We find that the reform is associated with an increase in the firms’ entry by 
approximately 15%. The same positive effect the reform has on the initial number of 
jobs created by start-ups. The reform is especially related to an increase in the number 
of firms with one and two employees. But lowering the minimum capital requirement 
does not affect the initial capital structure of start-ups. Our analysis reveals no 
statistically significant relation between the reform and debt-to-equity ratio of the new 
firms. However, the reform has impact on the initial capital and first year debt and 
equity amounts of newly established firms. After the reform firms put less initial capital, 
have less debt and less equity financing than firms formed in the absence of the reform.    
Although we observe an increase of firm entry due to the reform, because of data 
limitations we do not evaluate their quality except one-year survival rate. We find that 
the firms created after the reform are approximately one percentage point less likely to 
survive than the firms created in its absence. It may still occur that the newly created 
firms are marginal firms with poor performance. It may be useful to trace the 
performance of the post-reform eligible start-ups as well as to examine founders’ 
characteristics. Among the limitations of our work there is also the fact that our data is 




on a year basis. Considering that we know the exact date of the reform implementation, 
the information on the month of a firm entry could have helped us to construct better 
sample as well as to control the possible seasonality in the firms’ entries or to define the 
reform’s immediate effect. Moreover, as the reform was introduced relatively recently, 
we manage to determine its short term impact, while the long-run consequences remain 
unstudied.  
Nevertheless, our results are in line with the existing literature about the positive impact 
of lowering the minimum capital requirement on entrepreneurial activity and 
employment. The fact that the reform induces firms’ entry and job creation provides 
evidence that reducing the minimum capital requirement might be a possible instrument 
to promote entrepreneurship, stimulate labor market, facilitate competition and favor 
business activity. Furthermore, as the reform does not affect the new firms’ capital 
structure, we can infer that the initial stock does not reflect the creditworthiness of the 
start-up and debt holder willingness to lend. With no effect on debt-to-equity ratios, the 
reform does not affect financial stability of firms and their risk profile. Lower equity 
and debt amounts in the first year of operation indicate lower financing needs of the 
post-reform firms which correspond to their smaller size. In addition, having the right to 
choose the amount of capital invested into a new firm, founders put less initial capital, 
meaning that the previous minimum threshold defined by law was somehow 
burdensome.  
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Table 1: Summary of the empirical evidence on entry reforms 





Brazil introduction of 
SIMPLES sistem which 
implies bureacracy 
simplification and tax 
reduction, reducing costs 
of being formal  
no significant effect on firms 
formalization in general, but 
increase in official 
registrations of firms in retail 





Peru decrease in time and 
costs of licensing 
procedures 
increase in the number of 
licensed firms both 
previously operated in 








System and reducing 
number of registration 
procedures 
increase in firm creation due 
to former wage employees 
opening new firms; increase 
in job creation and 
competition; decrease in 





Russia reduction of regulatory 
burden, decrease of costs 
of licensing, registration 
and inspection 
better performance of small 
firms and increase of the 
small business formal sector 
in regions with good 
government institutions  
Branstetter 
et al.(2014) 
Portugal reduction of time and 
costs of setting up a 
company and creation of 
one-stop shop 
registration procedure  
increase in employment and 
in number of start-ups; new 
firms mostly appear in non-
tech industries, are small and 
less likely to survive within 
first two years of operation 






The UK elimination of the 
minimum capital 
requirement 
increase of new foreign firms 
incorporations from the EU 
in the UK due to absence of 
minimum capital requirement 
and low entry costs 
Ringe, 2013 Germany introduction of a new 
legal form 
(Unternehmergesellschaf
t) with 1 euro of 
minimum capital at the 
time of start-up 
no significant impact on the 
UK incorporations by 
German entrepreneurs, which 
decrease had been already 
observed even before the 
reform and could be 
explained by other reasons 
Hornuf, 
2012; 







reduction or abolishment 
of minimum capital 
requirement 
increase in LLCs 
incorporations and promotion 
of start-up activity in general 
 
This table is based on the existing literature and provides a summary of the empirical 
evidence on the entry deregulation reforms including reduction of the time, costs, 
number of procedures and minimum capital required to register a business.  
  




Table 2: The Summary of The Minimum Capital Reform in Portugal 
 
The Law Nº33/2011 of the 7th March 2011 
Purpose 
The law aims to lower costs of creating a company, to 
promote entrepreneurship and employment 
Content 
The law reduces the minimum capital requirement from 5000 
euro to 1 euro per quota 
Application 
The law is applied to Sociedade por Quotas and Sociedade 
Unipessoal por Quotas  
Exceptions 
The firms which type of activity is regulated by special laws 
or licensing are not eligible to the law 
This table presents the main points of the new minimum capital requirement legislation 
as of 7th of March 2011.  




Table 3: Non eligible industries for the minimum capital reform 





100 000 Decreto -Lei n.º 90/2002, de 11 de Abril, 
Decreto-Lei n.º 61/2011, de 6 de maio 
Road Passenger 
Transport 




equity equal or more 
than 10% of the 
threshold value of the 
corresponding class 
Decreto-Lei nº 59/99, de 02 de Março, 
Decreto-Lei nº 69/2011, de 15 de Junho 






50 000 for cars and 
125 000 for trucks 
Decreto-Lei n.º 136/2009, de 5 de Junho 
Industry of Motor 
Vehicles Rent 
50 000 Decreto-Lei 77/2009 de 1 de Abril , 
Altera (terceira alteração) o Decreto-Lei 
n.º 354/86, de 23 de Outubro  
Private Security starting from 50 000 Lei n.º 34/2013 de 16 de maio 




amount of capital not 
less than  100 000 - 17 
500 000 EUR 
depending on the type 
https://dre.tretas.org/dre/313102/ 
Portaria 335/2013 de 15 de novembro  
 
This table provides a summary of minimum capital needed to register a business based 
on the existing legislation for particular types of activity. The activities presented in this 








Table 4: Main Characteristics of Sociedade por Quotas and Sociedade Anónima 
 
Sociedade por Quotas Sociedade Anónima 
Minimum Capital Requirement, EUR 
Pre-reform 5 000 50 000 
Post-reform 1 50 000 
Minimum Number of Shareholders 2 or 1 
(in case of Unipessoal) 
5 
Type of Liability Limited Liability Limited Liability 
 
This table presents the main characteristics of firms of two legal forms: Sociedade por 
Quotas and Sociedade Anónima, the amount of initial minimum capital in euro required 
by law, the minimum number of founders-shareholders and the type of liability. 
  




Table 5: Summary Statistics - Average Number of New Firms Created per Year by 
Legal Form and by Nuts 
  Sociedades por Quotas Sociedades Anónimas Total 
Total 
Pre-reform 22 201 852 23 053 
Post-reform 22 617 597 23 214 
Change 1,87% -29,95% 0,70% 
Region (NUTS2)       
North       
Pre-reform 7 531 290 7 821 
Post-reform 8 399 224 8 623 
Change 11,52% -22,64% 10,25% 
Lisbon       
Pre-reform 7 315 367 7 682 
Post-reform 7 510 247 7 758 
Change 2,60% -48,44% 0,97% 
Center       
Pre-reform 4 071 106 4 178 
Post-reform 3 844 87 3 930 
Change -5,59% -18,46% -5,92% 
Algarve       
Pre-reform 1 259 35 1 295 
Post-reform 1 061 11 1 072 
Change -15,78% -68,70% -17,22% 
Alentejo       
Pre-reform 1 123 30 1 153 
Post-reform 1 048 16 1 064 
Change -6,67% -46,67% -7,71% 
Madeira       
Pre-reform 624 15 639 
Post-reform 454 8 462 
Change -27,26% -47,17% -27,74% 
Azores       
Pre-reform 277 9 286 
Post-reform 302 4 306 
Change 8,96% -55,56% 6,93% 
    
This table presents the average number of new firms created per year before (2004-
2010) and after the reform (2012-2014). The total average number of new firms 
established per year in each period is splitted by two legal forms (Sociedade por quotas 
and Sociedade Anónima) and also by seven regions of NUTS2 classification.   




Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of New Firms’ Characteristics 















Mean 2,37 2,15 3,40 3,57 2,41 2,19 
Std Dev      4,15 3,88 9,34 17,45 4,46 4,75 
Initial Capital           
Mean 16,78 9,84 339,77 245,93 28,72 15,91 
Std Dev      324,94 120,50 4172,61 1451,81 865,65 264,05 
Equity             
Mean 17,54 13,80 597,24 398,42 38,97 23,69 
Std Dev      599,71 271,23 8541,34 2805,68 1747,86 526,99 
Debt             
Mean 17,30 17,53 548,16 964,54 36,93 41,88 
Std Dev      671,93 298,50 7731,69 5427,62 1629,27 930,85 
Net Income           
Mean -3,87 -2,56 -42,70 -37,79 -5,31 -3,47 
Std Dev      108,85 55,50 595,16 612,69 156,70 112,61 
Debt-to-Equity           
Mean 0,21 -1,38 2,71 0,20 0,31 -1,34 
Std Dev      156,47 646,17 123,09 108,05 155,36 638,05 
Survival             
Mean 0,955 0,938 0,974 0,967 0,956 0,939 
Std Dev      0,21 0,24 0,16 0,18 0,21 0,24 
Observations 
Survival 155 408 43 910 5 966 1179 161 374 45 089 
Other 
variables 155 408 67 851 5 966 1 791 161 374 69 642 
 
This table gives descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of firms’ 
characteristics. Pre-reform period is from 2004 to 2010, post-reform period is from 
2012 to 2014. Size is initial number of employees; initial capital, net income, equity and 
debt are in thousands euro; the debt-to-equity ratio is calculated by dividing total debt 
amount to the amount of equity of a firm; survival is a one-year survival rate calculated 
not considering the firms created in the year 2014; observations are the number of 
observations for each category per corresponding period. 
  




Table 7: Number of new Sociedades por Quotas by the amount of Initial Capital 
Initial Capital Pre-reform Post-reform 
from 1 to 2 
  - 2 200 
  - 3,2% 
from 3 to 1000 
  - 22 313 
  - 32,9% 
from 1001 to 2000 
  - 3 817 
  - 5,6% 
from 2001 to 3000 
  - 3 868 
  - 5,7% 
from 3001 to 5000 
  117 783 25 509 
  75,9% 37,6% 
from 5001 to 50 000 
  31 791 8 848 
  20,5% 13,0% 
more than 50 000 
  5 657 1 296 
  3,6% 1,9% 
Total 
  155 231 67 851 
  100,0% 100,0% 
 
This table provides the number of newly formed Sociedades por Quotas according to 
the amount of initial capital in pre-reform and post-reform time. In the pre-reform time 
non of the presented firms have capital less than 5000 euro. The number of firms are 
accompanied by the corresponding percentage in the total number of Sociedades por 
Quotas in each period.  




Table 8: Impact of the Minimum Capital Requirement Reform on Firms’ Entry 
and Jobs Creation 
  Excluding 2011 Including 2011  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Firm Entry         
Minimum Capital reform 
(Policy=1) 
0,150*** 0,150*** 0,147*** 0,147*** 
  (0,0391) (0,0391) (0,0353) (0,0353) 
          
Control Variable for Population - -0,577 - -0,649 
  - (0,440) - (0,424) 
          
Control Variable for GDP - 0,0989 - 0,0428 
  - (0,517) - (0,498) 
          
Observations 9 380 9 380 10 472 10 472 
Adj. R-squared 0,723 0,723 0,719 0,719 
Panel B: Jobs Created  
Minimum Capital reform 
(Policy=1) 0,146*** 0,146*** 0,149*** 0,149*** 
  (0,0490) (0,0490) (0,0441) (0,0441) 
        
 Control Variable for Population - -0,557 - -0,581 
  - (0,563) - (0,542) 
    
 
  
 Control Variable for GDP - 0,326 - 0,287 
  - (0,652) - (0,627) 
        
 Observations 9 380 9 380 10 472 10 472 
Adj. R-squared 0,699 0,699 0,696 0,696 
 
This table presents the outputs of OLS regressions: columns (1) and (2) report the 
difference-in-difference estimators for the sample period without the year 2011 and 
columns (3) and (4) report the difference-in-difference estimators for the sample period 
including 2011. The coefficients for Treatedi and for the region, year and industry fixed 
effects are not reported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses and *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.  
  

















  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Entry         
Minimum Capital reform 
(Policy=1) 
0,170*** 0,0231 -0,0552* -0,0336 
  
(0,0372) (0,0314) (0,0295) (0,0245) 
Observations 9 380 9 380 9 380 9 380 
Adj. R-squared 0,693 0,557 0,545 0,491 
     
 
This table presents the outputs of four regressions (OLS) where the dependant variable 
is the logarithm of the number of new firms of the following sizes accordingly: with 
initial number of employees equal to one, two, from three to five and more than five. 
The coefficients for Treatedi and for the region, year and industry fixed effects are not 
reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 




Table 10: Effect of the Minimum Capital Reform on the Firms’ Survival 
  Excluding 2011 Including 2011 
  (1) (2) 
Survival     
Minimum Capital reform 
(Policy=1) 
-0,0103* -0,00787 
  (0,00576) (0,00510) 
      
Observations 206 463 230 445 
Adj. R-squared 0,00704 0,00788 
 
This table presents the outpu of the OLS estimation of the impact of the reform on the 
new firms’ survival. The dependent variable is one-year survival rate. The last year 
2014 is not included into the regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level 
respectively. 
  




Table 11: Impact of the Minimum Capital Requirement Reform on New Firms 
Initial Capital Structure 
  Excluding 2011 Including 2011, 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Debt-to-equity 
Minimum Capital reform (Policy=1) -0.236 -0.250 0.224 0.200 
  (4.772) (4.783) (3.962) (3.979) 
Sales   0.158  0.161 
  - (0.171) - (0.157) 
Size   -0.338  -0.303 
  - (0.430) - (0.394) 
Initial Capital 
Minimum Capital reform (Policy=1) -1.149*** -1.145*** -1.038*** -1.038*** 
  (0.0351) (0.0348) (0.0334) (0.0331) 
Sales   -0.0236***   -0.0224*** 
  - (0.000661) -  (0.000672) 
Size   0.283***   0.294*** 
  - (0.00426) - (0.00433) 
Debt 
Minimum Capital reform (Policy=1) -2.618*** -2.582*** -2.331*** -2.357*** 
  (0.436) (0.429) (0.397) (0.392) 
Sales   0.204***   0.191*** 
  - (0.00945) -  (0.00889) 
Size   2.624***   2.653*** 
  - (0.0560) - (0.0528) 
Equity 
Minimum Capital reform (Policy=1) -0.448*** -0.451*** -0.371*** -0.385*** 
  (0.0394) (0.0396) (0.0350) (0.0353) 
Sales   0.0385***   0.0400*** 
  - (0.000932)  - (0.000901) 
Size   0.327***   0.327*** 
  - (0.00590) - (0.00568) 
This table reports the outputs of the OLS and tobit regressions where the dependant 
variables are the debt-to-equity ratio of the start-ups, logarithms of initial capital, equity 
and debt of the new firms in the entry year. Column (1) and (3) refer to the estimation 
without the additional controls (logarithm of sales and logarithm of number of 
employees). The coefficients for Treatedi and for the region, year and industry fixed 
effects are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
